European governments are grappling with a difficult challenge: how to ensure their defense industries can rapidly produce massive quantities of drones and other military equipment in a future conflict—without stockpiling large amounts of hardware that may quickly become outdated.
This dilemma remains unresolved, according to Francois Arbault, the European Commission’s defense industry director, who spoke at the Forum Innovation Défense in Paris last week.
Arbault asked how Europe can be prepared to scale up to wartime production levels “without stacking warehouses with equipment,” noting that this has become one of the key strategic questions today. The real issue, he said, is understanding what it means to be ready for conflict when no war is underway.
Although all European NATO members have increased defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, none—France included—has embraced French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for a “war economy.” Structural economic changes to prioritize defense production simply haven’t happened.
Jérôme Cerisier, CEO of French night-vision manufacturer Exosens, said Ukraine’s situation is fundamentally different: its survival depends on rapid development and deployment of new capabilities. Europe, he noted, does not face the same immediate pressure to move at such speed.
Arbault echoed this, saying Ukraine’s need to constantly innovate under fire cannot be directly compared with Europe’s position. Still, Europe must be prepared. In a rapidly evolving technological environment, he argued, readiness should not mean producing and storing huge numbers of drones that may be outdated by the time they’re needed.
Innovation cycles in Ukraine can take as little as eight to ten weeks, whereas European development typically spans months or years, said André Loesekrug-Pietri, head of the Joint European Disruptive Initiative, after a recent visit to Ukraine.
A potential solution, according to Jolt Capital’s Marie Nicod, is to build up inventories of key components and technologies rather than complete systems. These modular building blocks could then be quickly assembled into whatever equipment is needed, without locking resources into unused stock.
Exosens has been gradually expanding its drone-camera production capacity to remain responsive while avoiding excessive up-front investment, Cerisier said. He emphasized the need to think about a war-economy framework as preparation rather than full implementation, noting that companies require clear visibility into future demand before committing major funds—something France’s military budget planning can help provide.
Preparing industry for potential large-scale conflict should also involve rehearsal scenarios to identify production bottlenecks, said Sylvain Rousseau, CEO of Aresia. Sometimes, he noted, tripling output comes down to just one missing machine or technology.
The EU introduced its first defense-industrial strategy in March 2024, focusing on boosting readiness. Former Commissioner Thierry Breton later said Europe must shift toward a “war economy mode,” one of the few times the term has been used at an EU-wide level.
Other European governments have also begun stressing defense-industrial strength. In March, Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans called the Ukraine conflict a battle of industrial capacity, while Sweden recently unveiled a strategy centered on high-volume production. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk similarly warned that Russia has triggered an arms race Europe must win.
France’s Directorate General for Armament (DGA), however, cautioned against direct comparison with Russia. Olivier Lecointe, who leads industrial policy there, noted that France will not accumulate wartime stockpiles, since long-term storage is costly and equipment could expire. Instead, the priority is ensuring industry can scale up efficiently when needed. That requires modernizing factories, acquiring new machinery, and hiring staff—investments that depend on predictable demand.
Older equipment remains functional, Lecointe said, but modern tools could dramatically boost output. Still, purchasing expanded production capacity without corresponding orders risks wasting public money.
High-volume wartime production will also require new, easily mass-manufactured systems. Lecointe said the DGA is working on this for drones and possibly other technologies. The agency is collaborating with companies to explore adapting civilian manufacturing lines—originally designed for entirely different products—to produce military hardware with minimal retooling. Contracts will eventually be signed to test this approach, but major orders will only follow if a crisis warrants them.
Rousseau warned that converting civilian factories for military use is extremely costly, raising questions about who will pay for preparedness in the absence of guaranteed orders. Some firms may assume part of the risk, but government support will still be needed for large-scale readiness.
Lecointe noted that although automotive suppliers could help expand defense production, the volume mismatch is significant: car manufacturers produce tens of thousands of units annually, while systems like the Caesar artillery guns are produced in small batches.
European armed forces are also becoming more open to rapid testing of new equipment, taking cues from Ukraine’s battlefield experimentation. This requires much faster feedback loops between the military and industry, Lecointe said. Preparing for high-intensity warfare demands a new way of working—one very different from the slow-cycle testing and procurement processes of the past.
