In the fluid landscape of geopolitical conflict, Israel may find itself unexpectedly acquiring Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missiles from an unlikely source. This development comes in the wake of Israel’s Operation “Northern Spear,” which sought to weaken Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon. Reports indicate that Israel has captured a significant stockpile of 9M133 Kornet systems, along with thousands of accompanying missiles, during these operations. The scale of these discoveries has been described as akin to “delivery trucks to Israel,” prompting serious consideration by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to integrate these systems into their military capabilities.
The Kornet, known to NATO as the AT-14 Spriggan, is a potent anti-tank weapon, highly regarded for its superior armor-piercing capabilities. It employs laser guidance, allowing the operator to maintain a lock on the target throughout the missile’s flight, ensuring high accuracy and minimal deviation. The 9M133 missile features a powerful cumulative warhead capable of penetrating over 1,200 mm of armor, even in the presence of reactive armor. With a maximum range of 5.5 kilometers, and certain variants extending up to 10 kilometers, the Kornet is adaptable for both offensive and defensive roles.
Additionally, the Kornet system is not limited to its standard warhead; it also offers a thermobaric variant, which is effective against structures, fortifications, and lightly armored vehicles, thus expanding its operational scope. Its compact design allows for deployment on portable infantry stands or armored vehicles, enhancing its versatility across different combat environments.
On November 4, Israeli news outlet *Israel Hayom* reported that the IDF is exploring the formation of new anti-tank units using the captured Kornet and Almas missiles, the latter comparable to Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ Gil system. Initially, the IDF had considered destroying part of the seized stockpile due to its vast quantity, but ultimately decided to transport a substantial portion back to Israel. During the operation, dozens of trucks loaded with weaponry were extracted from villages to prevent Hezbollah’s Radwan forces from accessing these critical resources.
Israel has a long history of capturing and repurposing enemy weaponry, often integrating it into its own military infrastructure. This practice was particularly evident during conflicts with neighboring Arab states in the latter half of the 20th century. For instance, after the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel seized numerous Soviet tanks, including the T-54 and T-55 models used by Egyptian and Syrian forces. Instead of discarding these captured assets, Israel retooled them with Israeli communication systems and armaments, rebranding them as Tiran-4 and Tiran-5 models. These modified tanks became key components of the IDF’s ground forces for decades, providing a cost-effective way to enhance its combat capabilities.
Similarly, during these wars, Israel captured a variety of Soviet-made anti-tank guided missiles, such as the Sagger (AT-3) and Fagot (AT-4), as well as guidance systems. Israeli engineers thoroughly examined and, in some cases, adapted these technologies for IDF use, further bolstering Israel’s military readiness. The study of captured weaponry also contributed to the development of new technologies and tactics, strengthening Israel’s defense systems.
A more recent example occurred during Israeli conflicts with Hezbollah in the 1980s and 2000s, where Israel successfully captured substantial quantities of weaponry, much of it supplied by Iran and Syria. These systems were tested and occasionally integrated into the IDF, providing critical insights into the capabilities and strategies of Israel’s adversaries. This ongoing practice of capturing and utilizing enemy weaponry not only strengthens Israel’s immediate military power but also drives innovation in its defense industry, preparing it for future conflicts.
The prospect of transferring seized Kornet missiles to Ukraine introduces significant diplomatic and strategic complications, particularly given the delicate state of Israel’s relations with Russia. Israel, as a close ally of the United States, faces pressure to support Western efforts in Ukraine. However, it also seeks to maintain a constructive relationship with Russia, especially regarding Syria, where Russia’s support for the Assad regime intersects with Israel’s security concerns. The potential transfer of Kornets to Ukraine could strain these ties, especially given Russia’s involvement in supplying Hezbollah with arms.
Should Israel opt to transfer the Kornet systems to Ukraine, it may be viewed as a strategic move to bolster Ukraine’s defense while simultaneously supporting Western objectives in the region. However, this decision would likely require third-party mediation—potentially by the United States or other Western nations—to mitigate any adverse repercussions on Israeli-Russian relations.
In conclusion, the question of transferring captured weaponry, such as the Kornet anti-tank missiles, to Ukraine is fraught with complexity. Israel’s national security, its geopolitical interests, and the broader strategic landscape all play a role in shaping this decision. The careful navigation of these issues will be critical to ensuring that Israel’s security and diplomatic standing are not unduly compromised.
