A group of five leading German defense investors, analysts, and industry figures has argued that Europe could achieve greater independence in defense and security by investing approximately €50 billion (US$59 billion) annually over the next 10 years. Their report estimates that developing strong strategic autonomy would require between €150 billion and €200 billion by 2030, with total spending reaching roughly €500 billion across the decade.
Published by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the report identifies ten major capability shortfalls Europe must address, including command-and-control systems, autonomous technologies, and long-range precision strike capabilities. The authors warn that Europe — and Germany in particular — still relies heavily on the United States for critical military functions ranging from satellite intelligence to battlefield coordination. Even with planned increases in defense budgets, current efforts would only lead to limited improvements in European self-reliance.
One of the report’s contributors, former Airbus CEO and current president of the German Council on Foreign Relations, Thomas Enders, stated that Europe could significantly reduce its dependence within just a few years if governments prioritize the effort politically and financially. He pointed to Ukraine’s wartime innovation as proof that rapid transformation is possible.
The paper, titled “Sparta 2.0,” was also co-authored by venture capitalist Jeannette zu Fürstenberg of General Catalyst, economist Moritz Schularick, Airbus chairman and former Deutsche Telekom CEO René Obermann, and security expert Nico Lange.
According to the authors, Europe could close many of its defense gaps within a few years if leaders treat the challenge with the urgency and focus of a “Manhattan Project.” They believe meaningful autonomous capability could emerge within three to five years, while broader strategic independence could be achieved in five to ten years through coordinated European action.
The report argues that the financial burden is manageable, estimating the required spending at roughly 10% of Europe’s overall defense expenditure, or about 0.25% of GDP over the next decade. However, the authors acknowledge that projected program costs carry uncertainty and could vary by 20% to 30%.
One of the most urgent priorities identified is creating an independent European command-and-control infrastructure. The report estimates this effort would take three to four years and cost between €10 billion and more than €20 billion. Europe currently lacks a homegrown equivalent to Palantir Technologies, making the development of a sovereign battle-management platform essential. Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management system is cited as a useful model.
The report also highlights Europe’s lag in adapting to drone-centric warfare. Building large-scale autonomous systems capacity could take three to five years and require investments exceeding €30 billion. Recommendations include establishing production lines capable of manufacturing millions of drones and loitering munitions annually, as well as launching a major unmanned ground vehicle program involving Germany’s automotive sector, defense manufacturers, and AI startups.
Another major weakness is ground-based precision strike capability, which the authors estimate could be addressed within three to five years at a cost of €20 billion to €30 billion. By contrast, sixth-generation fighter programs would likely require at least a decade and more than €200 billion, especially if Europe continues funding two parallel development initiatives.
Air defense remains another critical vulnerability, particularly in affordable counter-drone systems and short-range protection for brigades and infrastructure. The report also describes ballistic missile defense as a serious gap. Initial operational capability in this area could be developed within three to five years, while full deployment of next-generation interceptor systems may take up to a decade and cost around €50 billion.
Additional priorities include satellite reconnaissance, secure communications, positioning and navigation systems, and the development of a European alternative to SpaceX’s Starlink network. Other areas requiring urgent investment include space launch capability, airborne intelligence and surveillance, military cloud computing, AI-driven software systems, strategic airlift, and electronic warfare.
Rather than creating another large European bureaucracy, the report recommends that implementation be led by coalitions of willing nations working together on specific projects.
The authors also call for sweeping reforms in defense procurement. Instead of relying on lengthy specification documents, they advocate for prototype competitions, performance-based contracts, and production-focused procurement strategies. Lower barriers for startups and newer suppliers are also seen as essential.
Drawing lessons from Ukraine, the report argues that combining established defense contractors with innovative new companies creates a system that is more flexible, resilient, and cost-effective than dependence on a handful of major industry players.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that Europe already possesses the financial resources, industrial strength, and technological expertise needed to reduce its strategic dependence. In their view, the biggest obstacle is political fragmentation and the lack of coordinated commitment across the continent.
They argue that Europe’s long-term security will depend on technological leadership and decisive investment in critical capabilities, allowing the continent to defend itself more effectively and establish credible deterrence against future threats.
