When discussing the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, politicians and analysts frequently cite various figures, with $60 billion being particularly prominent. This sum represents the U.S. aid package currently stalled in Congress, funding that Kyiv desperately needs as its stockpile of artillery shells continues to dwindle.
Earlier this week, the White House attributed Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka to Russian forces to this ammunition shortage, emphasizing the urgent need for congressional approval of the aid package.
However, another significant number to consider is four million—that’s the estimated number of artillery shells Russia is expected to deploy in Ukraine this year. This raises a critical question: Can the U.S. and Europe match this level of supply, regardless of financial investment? And if they cannot, what does that mean for the war’s outcome?
According to research from the U.K.-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia’s arms industry plans to manufacture 1.3 million rounds of 152mm shells and 800,000 rounds of 122mm shells this year. Additionally, Moscow is set to receive two million 122mm shells from North Korea, bringing its total supply to just over four million, plus whatever can be salvaged from existing stockpiles, though many are in poor condition.
Matching this level of firepower is crucial for Ukraine, explains Nick Reynolds, a land warfare expert at RUSI and co-author of the report. “This is a key issue since both Ukraine and Russia rely heavily on artillery—it is the backbone of their militaries,” he said.
Despite the use of drones, missiles, and tanks, artillery remains the dominant force on the battlefield, responsible for 70% of casualties on both sides, according to Italy’s Risk and Strategy Weekly.
Can the West Match Russia’s Shell Supply?
Reaching four million shells is a daunting challenge for Western allies. On January 31, the European Union admitted it had fallen short of its March 2023 pledge to deliver one million shells within a year. Instead, EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell announced that only 524,000 rounds—just 52% of the target—would be delivered by March 2024.
These shells are being sourced from existing stockpiles and joint procurement efforts under the EU’s ASAP program, which allocates €2 billion ($2.2 billion) for purchases and inventory replenishment. “This is a work in progress,” Borrell stated, adding that an additional 630,000 shells are expected to be delivered later in the year.
When asked why the target was missed, a spokesperson for the Aerospace, Security, and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) pointed to political delays. “The procurement and export of ammunition is a political decision,” the spokesperson said.
Despite efforts to ramp up production, the European defense sector faces significant hurdles, including supply chain disruptions, rising material costs, labor shortages, regulatory obstacles, and years of underfunding. The spokesperson emphasized that long-term investments in production require stable contracts from European governments, ensuring a balance of risk between the public and private sectors.
This challenge contrasts sharply with Russia’s state-driven war economy, which has centralized arms production under state-owned Rostec to accelerate output.
Increasing Western Ammunition Production
In recent weeks, several European manufacturers have announced plans to boost production. Norwegian-Finnish firm Nammo has moved to 24-hour operations, while Germany’s Rheinmetall is constructing a new factory to produce 200,000 shells annually. Additionally, a plant in Ukraine—built in partnership with Rheinmetall—aims to manufacture “a six-digit number” of 155mm rounds per year.
The U.K. has pledged to significantly expand its production of 155mm shells, having already supplied Ukraine with 300,000 rounds. New BAE Systems production lines are expected to be operational by 2025, though precise output figures remain undisclosed for security reasons. However, a 2020 report from the Ministry of Defence suggested that the U.K. was gearing up to produce approximately 100,000 large-caliber shells per year.
At the EU level, Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton is set to introduce a new defense investment strategy on February 27. Additionally, by March 15, Brussels will announce up to 30 ammunition manufacturers that will receive €500 million in funding to scale up production.
Despite these initiatives, RUSI’s Nick Reynolds remains unconvinced. “We’re two years into the war, and the West is still assessing its industrial capacity and lead times. This is far from ideal,” he said.
One potential short-term solution, proposed by the Czech Republic, is to procure ammunition from outside Europe—an idea backed by the ASD. “This could serve as a stopgap until European production reaches the required capacity,” the ASD spokesperson said, though he cautioned that external purchases should not come at the expense of expanding domestic production.
The Battlefield Outlook for 2024
Even with these efforts, Ukraine will struggle to match Russia’s artillery output this year. “Russia is on track to produce four million shells in 2024—more than Ukraine can hope to receive from Europe, NATO, and the U.S. combined, especially considering Western countries’ own stockpile needs,” Reynolds explained.
That does not necessarily mean Ukraine will lose the war, but it does give Russia an opportunity to rearm. “The Russian military has suffered significant losses, limiting its ability to conduct large-scale maneuvers. However, it can still inflict heavy damage through attrition—particularly if Ukraine faces shell shortages,” Reynolds noted.
While major territorial gains may not be imminent, Russia’s ability to rebuild its combat power should not be underestimated. “A lack of dramatic changes on the battlefield should not lead to complacency,” Reynolds warned.
