France and Germany have established a high-level nuclear steering group, signaling another move toward strengthening Europe’s nuclear deterrence as uncertainty persists about the long-term reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.
In a joint statement, President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the group would function as a bilateral platform for “doctrinal dialogue and the coordination of strategic cooperation.” Its work will include consultations on the appropriate balance between conventional forces, missile defense systems, and France’s nuclear capabilities. The initiative is rooted in the 2019 Treaty of Aachen and follows several months of exploratory discussions that Merz first publicly mentioned at the Munich Security Conference in February.
The announcement coincided with a major address by Macron outlining notable adjustments to France’s nuclear strategy. He indicated plans to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal and suggested the possibility of extending France’s nuclear deterrent umbrella across Europe. In this context, he specifically referred to countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark.
Paris and Berlin also agreed to begin practical measures this year, such as involving German conventional forces in French nuclear exercises and organizing joint visits to strategic facilities. Despite these developments, both governments emphasized that the initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, NATO’s existing nuclear deterrence and nuclear-sharing arrangements, which rely heavily on the United States’ presence in Europe. The statement also acknowledged the United Kingdom’s contribution to NATO’s nuclear capabilities.
Meanwhile, the U.K. has been moving forward with efforts to modernize its own nuclear arsenal. The Franco-German declaration additionally reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear-sharing arrangements have long been criticized by Russia and some non-nuclear states, which argue they may conflict with the treaty’s provisions or principles. Since 2023, Russia has itself pursued a similar practice by deploying certain nuclear warheads in Belarus.
The Franco-German effort appears to have implicit support from the U.S. administration. Speaking at a Council on Foreign Relations event in early March, Elbridge Colby, the U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, expressed approval of a stronger European role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence framework.
Colby stated that a greater European contribution to NATO’s nuclear posture is both reasonable and appropriate from the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense. His remarks reflect a broader strategic shift in Washington’s approach: encouraging European allies to take greater responsibility for their conventional defense while the United States focuses more heavily on countering China. At a NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels in February, Colby indicated that although the U.S. would maintain its extended nuclear deterrence commitments, its conventional military support in Europe would likely become more limited and targeted.
Beyond nuclear matters, the new Franco-German steering group is also expected to address capabilities below the nuclear threshold. These include areas such as early-warning systems, air defense, and long-range precision strike—capabilities where Europe has historically faced shortfalls and which are considered critical in the event of a high-intensity conflict with Russia.
